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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 1L89

WILliE DIXON,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was charged in an Information with the
commission of the infamous crime against nature in violation
of Title 103, Chapter 551, Section 22, Utah Code Annotated,
1943. Tlre charging p~ut of the information being:
"That the said Willie Dixon on or about the 1st
day of February, 1948, in the County of Tooele, State
of Utah, did then and there wilfully, knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously commit an abominable and
despicable crime against nature, to-wit, that the said
Willie Dixon did then and there place his private part
in the mouth of one Milton Vern ell Stewart."
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The charge grew out of an alleged offence committed by
the defendant in the building in which the picture show was
being conducted in what is known as Todd Park in Tooele
County, Utah ,and the defendant was charged with the commission of the offense as set forth in the above referred to
Information.
STATEMENT OF FACT
After the complaint was filed against the defendant, a preliminary hearing was had before Justice of the Peace F. W.
Frailey, in Tooele City, Utah. At that time and as a basis of
binding the defendant over for trial the young boy, Vernell
Steward, who the record showed was but four years of age,
having not yet reached his fifth birthday at the time of the
commisison of the alleged offense, testified that the act was
committed by the defendant in the toilet room of the building
in which the picture show was being conducted and in the
early afternoon of the elate in question. The evidence will
show that the toilet room is an open room and although partioned off in three stalls, only in one stall was a toilet bowl, and
there was nothing but a two-by-four frame around the stalls
so that a person could r.e seen from any position in the toilet
room. The young boy testified that the act took place in this
toilet room and at the preliminary hearing he was supported
by three boys ranging from 11 to 13 years of age, to-wit,
Richard Harris, Lorin Smith and Clifford Webb, and the
evidence showed that the door into the toilet room had no
latch on and had no catch on to hold the door shut, and this
boy's testimony in the preliminary hearing was that while enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gaged in the operation of the offense charged, the defendant
stood with his back toward the door holding it so that it could
not be opened, and that the three boys forced the door open
and there found the defendant with his pants unbuttoned and
with the small boy standing somewhere near him. Upon this
testimoy the Justice of the Peace held the defendant to answer
to the charge in the District Court.
When the case was tried in the District Court, the small
boy and the three other boys testified that they had no knowledge of the commission of the offense in the toilet room, but
that when they went in the toilet room the defendant went
out and Vernell Smith, the small boy, went out also. That
about a minute later they saw the two go around the corner a
little to the west of the toilet room and they went and sat down
on a bench in the outside hall and in about a minute the two
came back out of the hall; that the defendant's pants were fully
buttoned; that he had his hands in his pockets, but that the
small boy was wiping his lips with his hands. All of these
accusations were denied by the defendant .
.ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Comes now the defendant and appellant and makes the
following assignments of error upon which he will rely for
a reversal of the judgment appealed from in this cause:
1. The Court erred in permitting the witness, Vernell

Stewart, to testify over the defendant's objections as to the
witness' qualifications to testify.

(T. pages 7-9).
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2. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion

for a directed verdict of not guilty.
3. The Court erred in permitting the verdict of the jury
of guilty to stand against. the defendant.
4. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
The first Assignment of Error is directed toward the
court's permitting the witness, Vernell Stewart to testify over
the defendant's objection as to his qualification to do so on
account of his extreme immature age and as to his ability to
do so. The State's Attorney in attempting to qualify him
asked him, "Do you know what happens if a little boy tells
a lie?" And he answered that question by saying, "Put in
jail." To which the prosecuting attorney put this question,
"He is punished for it, isn't he?" The court then interrupted
by saying, "You said he was put in jail, did you, Vernell ?" To
which the witness answered "yes", and then the following
questions were asked by the prosecuting attorney:

Q. You know what "to tell the truth", Vernell, means,
don't you?
A. Yes.
Q. You know what you mean when you tell the Court
you will tell the truth ?
A. Yes.
Q. What would you do if you tell the Court you will
tell the truth ~ You will tell the truth, will you?
A. Yes.
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Upon the basis of this kind of questioning the prosecuting
attorney concluded that the witness is competent to testify.
(T.p.6).
The defense attorney then asked him the following questions:
Q. Do you know what it means to take an oath when
you raise your hand, son?
A. Unh-uh.
Q. You don't know what that means at all, do you?
You say you will go to jail if you tell a lie. Do
you know what would happen to you if you go to
jail?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What would happen to you?

At that time the Court interrupted him with the following
statement:
You will tell Mr. Shields what you think would
happen, Vernell, if you told a lie. What would happen
to you? Do you know who Mr. Shields is, that man
sitting out there that just asked you that question?
A. Here?
The Court: You see him. He has got a tie on that
has some yellow in it.
A. Get put in jail.
Q. (By Mr. Shields) You say you would be put in
jail if you told a lie. Would anything else happen
to you if you told a lie? Nothing else would
happen to you except you would be put in jail;
is that right?
A. (Witness indicated the affirmative by a nod of
the head.)
Mr. Shields: I don't believe he is qualified. (T. p 7)
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The court then undertakes to examine the boy.
The Court then asked him when his birthday was, how
old he was, what color has pants were, what color his shirt
was, and then asked him if he has any friends and if so to name
any boys that he plays with. To which he answered "Unh-uh."
The Court then followed by asking him if he would tell
the truth if the Court asked him to tell the truth, to which he
said, "Uh-huh." Then he was asked the following questions:

Q. Do you think you are a good boy or a bad boy if
you tell the truth?
A. Bad boy.
Q. Do you think you are a good boy or a bad boy if
you told the truth-if you told the truth would you
be a bad boy or a good boy?
A. Good boy. (T. p. 7).

I

I

The Court then qualifies the witness and overrules the
objection to 4is testimony. The Court then instructs the boy
to stand up and be sworn, to which an objection was made
by the defense attorney. (T. p. 9).
The witness then on direct examination stated that he
saw the defendant on the day in question at the picture show,
and when asked if he said anything to him at that time,
answered, "Unh-uh." The boy then testified that the defendant wanted him to suck his pee pee for a dime, but that he didn't
give him a dime, and then when asked what happened after
he was asked to suck his pee pee, stated that the three boys
pushed the door open and went into the toilet room, and that
the defendant then left the bathroom and took him around
the corner-it will be remembered that the three boys who
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went into the toilet room testified that there was no such
actions going on when they went in there. The witness then
testified that he took him around the corner into the hall and
there wanted him to suck his pee pee a little, and that he sucked
it a little, and then he went back into the free show. (T. pages
11 and 12).
On Cross Examination, the following questions and
answers were asked and received from the boy witness after
stating that he and his father came to the Court House and to
the Sheriff's Office:

Q. Let me ask you if, in that conversation you didn't
say to the Sheriff that he didn't put his private in
your mouth?
A. Unh-uh.
Q. Didn't you tell the Sheriff that?
A. (Witness nodded head in negative.)
Q. Didn't you tell the man you were talking to in the
Sheriff's office, you didn't?
A. Who?
Q. That this man here, Mr. Dixon, didn't put his pee
pee-that is what you call it, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Didn't you tell the sheriff down there in his office,
that he didn't put it in your mouth, when you and
your father were there?
A. Unh-uh.
Q. What did you tell the sheriff about that? Do you
remember?
A. Unh-uh.
Q. Don't rememberThe Court: What do you mean when you say "unhuh"? What is your answer to that?
A. Don't know.
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The Court: Do you mean "Yes" or "No", when you
say that?
A. "No".
The Court: Say "No" instead of saying "Unh-uh"; or
Yes" instead of saying "Uh-huh".
Q. (By Mr. Shields) Let me ask you this: Didn't
you say down there, to the sheriff, in the Sheriff's
office downstairs, that you didn't put his pee pee
in your mouth, but you licked it?
A. Yes, I licked it.
Q. That is what you said to the Sheriff, wasn't it? Do
you remember that?
A. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.)
Q. And that was the truth, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. You remember saying that now, don't you?
A. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.) (T. pages
16 and 17).
The witness then testified that while in the toilet room,
as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

You came over here by him then, did you?
Yes.
Then, Vernell, what did he do, or what did you do?
He wanted to let me suck his pee pee, and those boys
was trying to get in.
What boys was trying to get in?
Them over there.
Those boys over there, all three of them?
Yes.
You say he was holding it with his back towards it?
Uh-huh.
And you were out in the door on this side of him;
is that right?
Yes.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And those three boys couldn't push that door open?
No. He took me around the corner, and they got in.
Took you around what corner?
Around that corner.
Tell me what corner?
Around by the back door.
Can you tell me, on this drawing, where that door is?
Unh-uh, I can't.
Was it outside of this toilet room ?
Yes. He went outside, then turned over by the
telephone, then turned the other way.
Down this hall here?
Yes; and there is a door that it takes you outside.
The door is down in this place, down in here?
Yes.
Did you go outside?
No.
You stayed in this hall that goes over here?
Yes.
Is this the hall that goes over to the picture show?
Yes.
Then where did he go?
Then he went, and I went back to the free show.
You left there and went back into the show, is that

A.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
it?
A. Yes.

(T. pages 21 and 22).

Lorin Smith testified that when they went into the toilet
room he was buttoning up his pants, and that he was in front
of the door; that is where the door would be and not by the
two by four, and that would be right back from the toilet bowl
in there, and that when they went in he was standing there
buttoning his pants, that he didn't see his privates and nobody
said anything to him at all. (T. p. 55).
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He testified about the defendant and Vernell Stewart going around the corner into the hall, and that after they went
out of the toilet room they could be seen from the sidewalk
until they went around the corner the other way; that after
they left the toilet room it was about a minute before the
boys came out and at that time the defendant and Vernell
Stewart were going around the corner and he was asked:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did you follow them around?
No.
Why?
I don't know.
You didn't suspect there was anything wrong going
on ,did youl
No.
There hadn't been anything happen at all that
would cause you to suspect anything wrong was
going on?
No.
And you didn't see anything wrong at all, did you?
No.
Not at any time?
No. (T. page 58).

And then again:
You are positive he had a coat and hat on?
Yes.
A cap and coat on; is that right?
Yes.
Couldn't be any doubt about that?
No.
Now when Mr. Dixon came around from the corner, where were his hands then?
A. In his pockets.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
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Q. In his pockets. His pants weren't unbuttoned, were
they?
A. No.
Q. You saw them go around the corner when they
came out of the toilet?
A. Yes.
Q. How long were they around the corner before they
came back?
A. About two or three minutes.
Q. About two or three minutes. It might have been
only one minute, mightn't it?
A. I don't think so.
Q. You don't think so. But it was a very short time,
wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And when they came around, Mr. Dixon had his
hands in his pockets?
A. Yes.
Q. And his pants weer fully buttoned up?
A. I think so.
Q. And there wasn't anything about that that caused
any alarm in your mind?
A. No; only that litle kid was spitting.
Q. Did that cause some alarm in your mind because
the kid was spitting?
A. No.
Q. It is very often the case that kids spit, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have seen them do it many times?
A. Yes.
Q. That didn't cause you any alarm, did it?
A. No.
Q. And he didnt say a word to you about anything
when he came around there?
A. No. (T. pages 59 and 60.)
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Certainly the three boys who were there didn't see anything that caused any alarm in their mind about anything that
was going on, which, of course, leaves the small boy's testimony
standing alone as to any commission of the offense charged in
the Information and of which the defendant was convicted.
We now desire to call the court's attention to some
authorities concerning this matter.
We, of course, do not believe that the testimony of the
small boy was competent and inasmuch as there was no other
testimony concerning the commission of the act at all, let us
call the Court's attention to the law which definitely states
that there must be a penetration of the private part into the
mouth of the victim in order to constitute an offense. In
suport of this theory, we call the court's attention to an Oregon
case, State vs. Start, 132 Pac. 512 at 513:
"It is said in Section 1539 L.O.L. that 'proof of
actual penetration into the body is sufficient to sustain
an indictment for rape or for the crime against nature.
No particular opening of the body into which penetration can be made is specified in this section.
It follows that the actual penetration of the virile
member into any orifice of the human body except the
vaginal opening of a female is sufficient for the establishment of the crime in question."
I now refer to 48 Am. Jur. at page 550, wherein the following is stated:
"And when the crime of sodomy or the crime against
nature is committed. where the act consists of penetration of the mouth. As stated by one court in construing
the statute on this subject, since no particular opening
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the body into which penetration can be made is
specified, it follows that the actual penetration of
the virile member into any orifice of the human body
except the vaginal opening of a female is sufficient for
the establishment of the crime in question."
In State vs. McGruder (Iowa), 101 N.W. 646, it appears
that the language of the statute defining "sodomy"' includes
penetration in any opening of the body other than the sexual
parts.
In the case of Means vs. State, a Wisconsin case, 104 N.W.
815, it was decided under a statute which specifically provided
that said crime may be committed by the penetration of the
mouth.
In the case of Weaver vs. Territory (Arizona) 127 Pac.
724, it was held:

"That a statute providing for any sexual penetration,
however slight, would not sustain a conviction of
sodomy where the act was committed by penetration of
the mouth, yet it would seem that the better reasoning
was with the court in the case of State vs. Start.
This is the Oregor:. case hereinabove referred to.
In the case of Kinnan vs. State, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 478,
it is said:
Though there is a conflict of opinion on this question, weight of authority and the best-reasoned cases
sustain Glover vs. State in holding that one may be
convicted of the crime of sodomy or the crime against
nature when the act is committed by penetration of
the mouth.
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In the case of State vs. Long, a Louisiana case, at 63 So.
180, is the following:
"Whoever shall be convicted of the detestable and
abominable crime against nature, committed with man. kind, or with the mouth, shall," etc., was held sufficient
when read in the light of the common law, and of the
history of the crime of sodomy at common law, to
sustain an indictment when the act was committed by
penetration of the mouth.
There are a great number of cases along this line holding
the same thing, and we cite them to show that in order that
the crime of which the defendant is charged could be committed, there must be shown that there was a penetration of
the mouth, and we find no case that relaxes this rule.
We, therefore, again refer to the testimony of the small
boy, Vernell Stewart, as found on page 17 of the transcript, as
follows:

Q. Let me ask you this: Didn't you say down there,
to the sheriff, in the sheriff's office downstairs, that
you didn't put his pee pee in your mouth, but you
licked it?
A. Yes, I licked it.
Q. That is what you said to the sheriff, wasn't it? Do
you remember that?
A. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.)
We repeat that this evidence is significant and is binding
as to what happened, if anything happened, with this young
boy and the defendant, and conclusively shows that there was
no penetration into the mouth of the little boy at all, and in
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absence of proof of penetration, we say that the evidence does
not support a conviction of the defendant.
We desire to call the court's attention to the testimony
of .Mr. Dixon concerning what happened there that day contained in the transcript, pages 76 to 97, inclusive, and we say
unequivocally that the evidence is not sufficient to convict
the defendant of the charge layed in the information.
Now while we are fully aware of the law concerning
competency of witnesses, we desire to call the court's attention
to a few cases on that pomt. The statute of 1943, Section
104-49-2, under who may not be witnesses, is as follows:
Sub-section ( 2) Children under ten years of age,
who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of
the facts respecting which they are examined, or of
relating them truly.
We submit that an examination of the testimony of this
small boy brings him under the category above referred to.
In the case of State vs. Blyth, 20 Utah 378, this statute
was referred to, and the court had this to say:
"As will be noticed this provision of the statute does
not apply to all children under ten years of age, but
to such only as 'appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of facts,' concerning the subject of inquiry,
or of stating them truly."
And then it goes on to say:
"When, therefore, objection is made to the competency of a child under ten years of age, it becomes a
question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
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court, and the appellate court will not interfere, if the
lower court, upon examination made upon its voir
dire, or upon all of its testimony, concludes that the
child is competent to testify, unless there is a clear
abuse of discretion apparent from the record."
We submit that there was an abuse of discretion upon the
part of the court in allowing this witness to testify, and that
the record so shows.
In the case of Darneal vs. State of Oklahoma, 1 A.L.R.
638, we have the following:
"He first contends that the court erred in permitting
Rachael Garrison, a girl nine years of age, to testify
as a witness against him. - The statute of this state
governing the competency of witnesses of tender age
is as folows: "The following persons shall be incompetent to testify. . .. 2. Children under ten years of
age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions
of the facts representing which they are examined, or
of relating them truly."
It is apparent from the reading of the above statute
that the question of the competency of a witness under
ten years of age is a matter addressed peculiarly to the
discretion of the trial court. If the trial court permits
such a witness to testify, and it appears conclusively
from the record on appeal that there has been an abuse
of that sound discretion placed in such court, then this
appellate court is authorized and will reverse a judgment of conviction upon such ground if it appears that
the testimony of such witness was prejudicial to the
accused."
Certainly one cannot examine this record of the testimony
of this young boy, Vernell Stewart, without being impressed
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with the fact that the court abused its discretion in permitting
him to testify over the objection of the defendant. While it
is true that the boy did a fairly good job with his testimony
when being asked by the prosecuting attorney leading questions
to which he could answer "Unh-uh" and "Uh-huh"' to, but
we were never able to determine with such answers just whether
he meant what the answers indicated or whether he actually
knew what his answers meant, and the same result was obtained
when the court attemped to coach him in his testimony when
it did not appear that the prosecuting attorney was doing a very
good job at the coaching with leading questions.
The case of the State vs. McMillan, 46 Utah 19 at page
22, it appears in that case that the girl in question was between
7 and 8 years of age, and the question of her ability was raised,
and the court in holding that it was within the discretion of
the trial court to accept the testimony of children under 10
years of age. The court still holds that if it is made to appear
that the court abused its discretion in that regard, the supreme
court may interfere with such action.
Also, the same holding in the case of State vs. Marasco,
42 Utah page 5 at page 8.
We submit that a careful reading of the record in this
case would reveal that the court abused its discretion in permitting this boy to testify over the objection of the defendant,
and while it is true that counsel and the court by asking leading
questions, and suggestively, got some fairly good testimony
from this young boy, yet upon his cross examination as heretofore referred to, he appeared as though a new light had
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dawned upon him, and he very readily remembered what he
had told the sheriff concerning the transaction in question,
and we therefore submit that there is no evidence upon which
a jury could bring in a verdict of guilty against the defendant
in this case, and that the court should have granted the defendant's motion directing the jury to bring in a verdict of
not guilty.
In going over this case I am very much impressed with
the seriousness of the crime as I recall it carries a sentence in
the state penitentiary up to 20 years. The defendant has lived
at Todd Park for six or seven years, and has been around there,
and the evidence shows with children on the play grounds,
and there has been no evidence in all that time of any misconduct upon his part, and even in the face of such a record
and in the face of the extreme lack of sufficient testimony to
convict him of the offense, the court refused to consider the
question of probation or parole for him and sentenced him to
a term in the State Penitentiary.
We submit that the evidence does not support such a
conviction or a f.nding, and that this court should reverse the
conviction and either direct that the defendant be discharged
or order a new trial of his case.
Respectfully submitted,
E. LEROY SHIELDS

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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